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Abstract. This paper assesses the impact of assistance on the wellbeing of Palestinian 
households. The impact evaluation analysis uses a difference-in-difference approach 
for the treatment of sample selection bias. The paper uses data from the 2013 and 
2014 rounds of the Palestinian Socio-Economic and Food Security survey to estimate 
the impact of assistance to West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) households on their 
poverty and food security status. Results suggest that both poverty and food inse-
curity would have been much higher for WBGS as a whole without assistance, fur-
ther increasing in areas with lower levels of assistance. However, the average positive 
impact of assistance hides a lot of heterogeneity. In fact, while there is a clear posi-
tive impact of the intensity of assistance on poverty reduction, food consumption and 
diet diversity in the West Bank, Gaza Strip analysis shows mixed results. Results high-
light how the international community cannot disengage from supporting Palestinian 
households without severely impacting their wellbeing.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between foreign assistance2 and development is one of the most 
debated topics in development policy. Since World War II, the debate shifted from dis-
cussing the rationale for mobilizing foreign resources to boost economic growth (Chenery 
and Bruno, 1962; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Lal, 1972), to assessing the impact of aid on 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
2 Foreign assistance is a broad term for any voluntary transfer of resources from one government, international 
organization, or NGO to a recipient country, usually a developing country. It encompasses loans (both soft or 
hard) and grants as well as in-kind transfers and technical assistance. The paper uses “foreign assistance” inter-
changeably with the term “foreign aid”. 
*Corresponding author: gianluca.stefani@unifi.it
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economic growth and poverty reduction (Bauer and Yamey, 1982; Cassens & Ass., 1986; 
Krueger, 1986; Mosley, 1987; Collier and Dollar, 2001 and 2002), and subsequently to 
generating evidence in order to better design interventions and enhance aid effectiveness 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001). 
More recently, increasing attention has been devoted to assessing the effectiveness of 
assistance delivered in fragile contexts.3 This shift was driven by empirical evidence sug-
gesting that natural, economic and political risks are rising across the world (World Bank, 
2011; Zseleczky and Yosef, 2014), as well as by the rapidly growing literature on fragile 
states (Ipke, 2007; Kaplan, 2008; Zoellick, 2008; Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray, 2008; 
Stewart and Brown, 2009; Andrimihaja et al., 2011; Chandy, 2011; Naudé et al., 2011). 
The key question here is whether aid can deliver its expected results within fragile/conflict 
contexts. The literature shows mixed empirical evidence (Dollar and Levin, 2006; Fielding 
and Mavrotas, 2008; Ishihara, 2012; Chandy et al., 2016). As a result, many practitioners, 
policymakers, and even laypeople express mounting concern for the poor development 
records within fragile country contexts. This implies a need to develop new approaches 
that explicitly address fragility pathways to insecurity when designing development and 
humanitarian assistance strategies in fragile/conflict contexts (OECD, 2007; EU Commis-
sion, 2009; World Bank, 2011).4
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the impact of assistance in frag-
ile contexts by adopting a microeconomic perspective. It aims to estimate the impact of 
assistance intensity on household wellbeing proxied by two outcome dimensions, poverty 
and food security. We adopt a counterfactual framework using a difference-in-difference 
approach to address sample selection bias as well as instrument variable econometric 
modeling to get rid of endogeneity problems where appropriate (e.g. poverty reduction). 
The empirical application focuses on the specific fragile, protracted-crisis context of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) as a case study. This specific region was chosen 
for several reasons. WBGS has been among the highest per-capita recipient of official 
development assistance worldwide (World Bank, 2019) and it is also experiencing one of 
the longest contemporary conflict in the world. The majority of Palestinians living under 
occupation would be unable to meet their own bare necessities since both humanitar-
ian and development interventions in WBGS are largely financed by foreign assistance. 
Indeed, the pledge for humanitarian assistance, amounting to USD 540 million in 2018 
(OCHA, 2017a), is completely financed by foreign resources. Similarly, the share of for-
3 There is no universally accepted definition of fragility. Instead of trying to stringently define fragility, OECD 
(2015) identifies fragile contexts according to a multi-dimensional framework that helps reveal different patterns 
of vulnerability in a given country. The five fragility “clusters” considered by OECD are the following: widespread 
violence, limited justice, ineffective and unaccountable institutions, weak economic foundations, and low resil-
ience to shocks and stressors. These characteristics substantially impair the fragile country’s economic perfor-
mance, the delivery of basic social services, and the efficacy of donor assistance. 
4 This was explicitly considered by the so-called “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” announced at 
Busan in 2011. This deal identified five “Peace-building and State-building Goals”: legitimate politics, security, 
justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services (https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/). It also considered 
in the United Nation’s “New Way of Working”, (https://www.un.org/jsc/content/new-way-working) within which 
humanitarian, development and peace actors are called to work together to pursue collective outcomes over 
multiple years to overcome the traditional divide between humanitarian and development interventions. This is 
at the core of the so-called “Triple nexus”, which aims to integrate the humanitarian, development and peace 
aspects of interventions.
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eign support in 2018 accounted for as much as 48% of total development expenditure, a 
sum roughly equal to USD 381 million (IMF, 2018). 
Between 2007-2016, the yearly average total of aid received amounted to more than 
2.3 billion USD per year or 23% of Palestinian GDP (WDI, 2018). Despite such large aid 
inflows, the Palestinian GNI per capita is still around USD 3,180 (WDI, 2018), qualifying 
WBGS as a lower-middle income country. Similarly, the Palestinian HDI is 0.686, placing 
WBGS 119th out of 189 countries and territories (UNDP, 2018). According to the humani-
tarian needs assessment (OCHA, 2018), some 2.5 million people are in need of assistance 
on a total population of 4.95 million and 1.9 million people are targeted by humanitarian 
interventions. In factIn light of this, data released by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS) regarding the 2013 and 2014 Socio-Economic and Food Security (SEF-
Sec) survey data (FSS-PCBS, 2016) — designed for the first time as a panel — offers a 
unique opportunity to assess the impact of assistance on household poverty and food 
security in WBGS. It is important to note that from 2013 to 2014, the period in which the 
data was collected, the region faced persistent occupation as well as an open-arm conflict 
in the Gaza Strip occurring from July 2014 to August 2014.
To conduct the aforementioned analysis, the paper is organized in the following way: 
Section 2 reviews the literature on aid and development, looking at both theoretical argu-
ments and empirical results. Section 3 introduces the Palestinian context and provides an 
overview of assistance to Palestinian households. Section 4 analyzes Palestinian house-
holds’ profiles in terms of poverty and food security at the beginning of the period of 
analysis. Section 5 describes the data and methods used in the impact evaluation. Section 
6 discusses the results of the impact evaluation analysis. Finally, Section 7 summarizes 
main findings and discusses policy implications.
2. Foreign Assistance and Development: An Introduction
Foreign assistance can be traced back to the colonial period. At the time, European pow-
ers provided large amounts of money to their colonies, typically to improve infrastructure, 
with the ultimate goal of increasing economic output. The use of foreign assistance as it is 
known today — as an instrument to help poor countries improve living standards — came 
into existence only after World War II (Thorbecke, 2000). The emergence of a new economic 
order and the founding of international organizations (such as the United Nations, the IMF, 
and the World Bank) following WWII shaped foreign aid to become what it is today. The 
success of the Marshall Plan, the US-sponsored package implemented between 1948 and 1953 
to rehabilitate the economies of Western and Southern European countries, showed that capi-
tal transfers alongside technical assistance could effectively spur growth so that targeted econ-
omies were able to surpass their pre-war economic levels by 1952. 
Aid to developing countries today is more complex. Its use is determined by several 
intertwined motives, including altruism, access to markets and resources, geopolitics, and 
colonial legacies. The impact of foreign assistance to developing countries is mixed, with 
success stories in various South East Asian countries but also numerous failures in Sub-
Saharan countries (Kanbur, 2000). 
Foreign aid is thought to have helped poor countries raise income per-capita growth 
rates, in some cases converging with high-income countries, successfully lifting large seg-
24 D. Romano et alii
ments of the population out of poverty. However, this is difficult to establish unequivo-
cally. There are two major difficulties when analyzing the relationship between foreign 
assistance and development. Firstly, there are issues with different theoretical frameworks–
macro as well as micro–that provide the rationale for foreign aid interventions. Secondly, 
empirical studies lack conclusive evidence, making it hard to identify causal links between 
aid and development outcomes. Indeed, there is a large gap between aid achievements at 
the micro and macro levels, with greater difficulties in establishing causalities at the mac-
ro/country level compared to the micro/project level. This is the so-called “micro-macro 
paradox” (Mosley, 1987). As a consequence, the effectiveness of aid in the promotion of 
development is often uncertain and controversial, with personal opinions often deeply 
founded in ideology. 
The consequence is an ongoing debate regarding best practices in the provision of for-
eign assistance aptly named the “aid debate”.5 Positions on the matter range from strong 
believers in the potential effectiveness of foreign aid who advocate for even more aid 
(Sachs, 2005), to deep skeptics stressing the importance of experimentation and learn-
ing from past mistakes (Easterly, 2006). Along this spectrum lie pragmatists who sup-
port peace and the use of a broad set of instruments (Collier, 2007) as well as opponents 
endorsing anti-corruption practices to increase aid effectiveness (Moyo, 2009). Finally, the 
aid debate also includes scholars who argue for the reduction of damaging OECD trade 
policies in agriculture, increased provision of technical assistance regarding institution 
building, an increase in investment devoted to fighting diseases and improving agricultur-
al technology in tropical environments, and greater support for institutional reforms that 
favor secure property rights, the rule of law, and a reduction in arms sales to developing 
countries (Deaton, 2013).
2.1 Macroeconomic perspective
The most important theoretical arguments in support of foreign aid as an effective 
strategy to boost growth and catch-up to rich countries are rooted in Keynesian growth 
models. The Harrod-Domar model (Domar, 1957) provides theoretical background for 
growth in developing country contexts by identifying savings rate and choice of technique 
(via the incremental capital-output ratio, or ICOR) as the two determinants of a country’s 
growth rate. The policy implications the model suggests for accelerating growth are clear: 
raise the savings rate (i.e. promote savings through stronger financial institutions) and 
lower the ICOR (i.e. increase the marginal productivity of capital through better technol-
ogy). This is where foreign aid transfers come in. Using these transfers for investment can 
fill domestic saving gaps in developing countries, thus providing a  “Big Push” to kick-off 
economic growth (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).
A popular extension of the Harrod-Domar model devised in the 1960s in Latin 
America defined two kinds of capital goods used in production. The first kind are capital 
goods of domestic origin, such as buildings financed by domestic savings, while the other 
5 Foreign aid has throughout its history been subjected to close scrutiny both by academic researchers and oth-
ers (Dethier, 2008). A large literature extending over several decades bears witness to this, and the boundary 
between policy advocacy and research has not always been clearly delineated.
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kind are of foreign origin, such as imported intermediate goods and machinery paid for 
using foreign savings. If the two forms of capital are in fixed proportion, then the scarcest 
of the two types of savings will always be binding. This is the core of the “two-gap model” 
(Chenery and Bruno, 1962; Chenery and Strout, 1966). Foreign aid that increases foreign 
savings can effectively increase growth with enough domestic savings, despite a deficit of 
foreign exchange. However, foreign aid cannot translate to growth if there is a deficit of 
domestic savings even if an economy has enough foreign exchange to acquire necessary 
amounts of imported capital goods.
Subsequent developments are based on new growth theory, which endogenously 
explains productivity growth by extending the above paradigm with an analytical basis 
for empirical cross-country studies (Robinson and Tarp, 2000). The underlying causal 
chain runs from aid to savings, from savings to investment, and finally from investment 
to growth. In the new growth theory approach, investment and productivity variables are 
assumed to depend on policy and institutional variables.
Usually, the effectiveness of aid has been empirically tested using country-level macro 
data, with aggregated aid as a single resource. Such tests examined whether more aid lead 
to better outcomes, in particular whether more aid lead to higher growth. It is no surprise 
that reduced-form analysis shows tenuous links between aid and development outcomes, 
since aid is often advanced for non-developmental objectives, such as disaster relief or 
military and political ends. As emphasized by Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007: 317) 
development economists must better understand “the links from aid to final outcomes” 
because “trying to relate donor inputs and development outcomes directly, as through 
some kind of black box, will most often lead nowhere.” Opening the black box allows 
for the identification of three types of links–from donors to policy-makers, from policy-
makers to policies, and from policies to outcomes–which, in turn, may provide additional 
answers.
Empirical studies on the link from donors to policymakers reveal a body of circum-
stantial evidence built primarily on years of failed aid efforts (Dollar and Levin, 2006). 
Donor views regarding the “right development policies” have been promoted through aid 
conditionality with little attention to specific country contexts. For instance, public enter-
prise privatization and finance liberalization have at times been regarded as necessities, 
though were encouraged with little regards for local socioeconomic conditions, making 
such measures ineffective, risky, or simply counterproductive. The link from policymak-
ing to policy formulation and implementation depends largely on governance systems. 
There is evidence suggesting the association between good governance and good poli-
cies, although the direction of causality is hard to determine. In practice, most research 
has focused on the relationship between governance and development outcomes, bypass-
ing the impact on policies and pointing instead to the importance of good governance for 
better outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Regarding the impact of policies on outcomes, 
there is a good understanding of the effect of macro stability, investment climate, as well 
as well-managed trade openness on growth, even though country specificity can make it 
hard to generalize the impact of these factors. Cross-country comparisons however indi-
cate that better-quality policies are associated, on average, with higher GDP growth.
Some authors use empirical analyses to argue that aid leads to growth with decreas-
ing returns (Hansen and Tarp 2001). Others suggest that national growth-inducing pol-
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icies may reduce aid effectiveness because good policies and aid are substitutes of each 
other (Dalgaard and Hansen 2001). Finally, some authors hold that aid stimulates growth 
conditional on key features. For instance, it is often argued that aid works if provided 
to countries that implement good policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000). This conclusion 
was questioned by Easterly et al. (2004) who showed that the aid-policy relation was not 
robust enough for the expansion of the database in years and countries. Despite such dif-
fering positions, cross-country regression analysis largely concludes that the relationship 
between aid and development outcomes is weak and often ambiguous (Rajan and Subra-
manian, 2005; Clemens et al., 2004). 
In recent years, econometric assessments have included meta-analyses to synthesize 
results from the existing body of empirical data while controlling for heterogeneity among 
studies. Surprisingly, even these studies, which are supposed to provide more objec-
tive analyses, have contributed little to resolving the aforementioned controversies. Con-
sider, for instance, two such studies by Doucouliagos and Paldman (2009) and Mekasha 
and Tarp (2013): while the former failed to find any significant impact of foreign aid on 
growth, the latter found an impact that is both positive and statistically significant. 
In conclusion, macro growth effects are both harder to achieve and harder to observe. 
They are harder to achieve than micro growth effects because the magnitude of aid may 
not be sufficient to affect recipient countries’ macro variables, and harder to observe 
because causality is difficult to establish in cross-country regressions (Mavrotas, 2015).
2.2 Microeconomic perspective
Non-conclusive results of reduced-form cross-country aid regressions brought about 
the need to establish the channels through which aid mattered the most for economic 
growth and poverty reduction (Dalgaard et al., 2004). This was done through empirical 
studies at the micro level that analyzed the impact of single project and program inter-
ventions. Until the 1990s, these evaluations were based on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of 
single projects by computating the internal rate of return of the intervention. Such studies 
show that aid is effective at the micro level when taking into considerations local projects 
(Hirschman, 1967; Mehrotra and Jolly, 1997). However, these results came under severe 
criticism once the concept of aid fungibility, i.e. aid money being used for purposes other 
than those earned, spread. In fact, rate-of-return metrics ignore more complex opportu-
nity-cost issues like the fungible use of foreign aid. The approach also became problem-
atic as donors started to embrace broader goals for aid, such as environmental sustain-
ability and multiple social goals with hard-to-quantify objectives. In parallel, the weakness 
of CBA-based impact evaluations, summarized under headings such as “before-and-after” 
and “with-and-without,” was the topic of many debates. Consequently, methodological 
issues became increasingly important in the aid-effectiveness debate (Cassen & Ass., 1987; 
World Bank, 1998).
More recently, knowledge at the micro and project level has expanded based on evalu-
ations using advanced econometric techniques and rigorous experimental or quasi-exper-
imental designs. Econometric techniques are used to examine the impact of specific poli-
cies or projects on local communities, household decision making, and individual welfare 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Given the number projects and their different impacts in var-
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ying country circumstances, continued evaluation and revision is needed. Impact evalua-
tion evidence began in the mid-1990s. By the turn of the century, impact evaluation pub-
lications became increasingly more common, continuing to date (Cameron et al., 2016). 
Rigorous ex-post impact evaluations help inform government and donor decisions, an 
idea supported by donor agencies and even by aid critics (e.g., Easterly 2006). However, an 
evaluation gap still exists. This is because governments, official donors, and other funders 
do not demand or produce enough impact evaluations and those that are conducted 
are quite often methodologically flawed (Savedoff et al., 2006). This calls for a system-
atic review of conclusions drawn from such studies. Several initiatives have been imple-
mented in response to this issue, such that many reviews and meta-analyses are in circu-
lation today. In terms of sectors, the ones most represented in studies are social protec-
tion, health and nutrition, and education. Cash transfers is the most represented modality, 
though in-kind transfers and vouchers are also well-researched, especially in the context 
of humanitarian crises. Randomized control trials and difference-in-difference studies are 
the most widely used methods.
Studies assessing the causal relationship between interventions and outcomes of 
humanitarian assistance generally lack a reliable and robust base of evidence (Clarke et 
al., 2014). Only a small proportion of the many evaluations of humanitarian assistance 
use designs with a counterfactual, control or comparator group that allows the studies to 
attribute measurable changes outcome indicators to programs or policies. However, there 
are also several examples of randomized trials. It is possible to generate evidence for spe-
cific questions using randomized trials, although this evidence base is limited and concen-
trated in certain areas, such as mental health (Cameron et al., 2015).
Foreign aid has generally brought about a positive contribution in education, the 
most tangible outcome being increased enrolment rates in primary education (Riddell 
and Niño-Zarazúa, 2016; Birchler and Michaelowa, 2016). However, there is a consider-
able gap regarding the contribution of aid to improvements in the quality of education. 
Masino and Niño-Zarazúa (2016) conducted a systematic review of experimental and 
quasi-experimental evidence to establish what works best to improve education quality 
in developing countries. They found that educational policies are most successful when 
implemented in combination with multiple interventions. Aid channeled into a variety of 
interventions, targeting different educational levels and utilizing different aid modalities 
works best. Considering this heterogeneity, it should not be surprising that a generalized 
blueprint applicable to all developing countries hasn’t been devised.
Literature in the food security and nutrition sector has a lot of variation in program 
implementation (e.g. size and modality of transfers, duration and frequency of transfers, 
strength of conditions, pre-existing levels of undernutrition, health services). This makes 
difficult to establish which of the various interventions on food security and nutrition is 
most effective. Conclusions of summary studies range from cautiously optimistic (Ahmed 
et al., 2009; Ruel et al., 2013) to lacking significant results (Manley et al., 2012). In 2016, 
Doocy and Tappis reviewed 108 studies on intervention modalities. They found that 
unconditional cash transfers and vouchers may improve household food security among 
conflict-affected populations and maintain household food security during crises specifi-
cally affecting food, such as droughts. Moreover, unconditional cash transfers led to great-
er improvements in dietary diversity and quality than food transfers. Food transfers were 
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found to be more effective in increasing per capita caloric intake than unconditional cash 
transfers and vouchers. While the evidence reviewed offers some insights, the scarcity of 
rigorous research on cash-based approaches limits the strength of such findings.
However, drawing on findings from randomized control trials, Karlan and Appel 
(2012) identify seven ideas that work: microsavings; reminders to save; prepaid fertilizer 
sales; deworming; remedial education in small groups; chlorine dispensers for clean water; 
and commitment devices. Likewise, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) draw on experimental 
studies to identify a host of promising interventions in areas ranging from health and 
education to policing.
Though promising, impact evaluation studies have several limitations. It is illusory to 
believe that all interventions can be subject to impact evaluations and that such evalua-
tions will permit the flow of aid exclusively to what works, as some have suggested (East-
erly, 2006; Banerjee, 2007). It is impossible to evaluate all projects. Evaluations can also 
be misleading when projects or programs are applied outside the context in which they 
were evaluated, meaning there is a serious problem of external validity (Pritchett and San-
defur, 2013). Furthermore, many policies have general equilibrium effects often ignored 
by impact evaluations. This suggests that unlocking the secret of aid effectiveness is most 
likely to be revealed by trial and error than by randomized control trials (Deaton 2013). 
Nonetheless, experimental and quasi-experimental studies are grossly underutilized 
instruments with tremendous scope to improve and regularize their use in bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies. A larger evidence base and a more standardized approach 
to documenting and comparing costs and benefits of interventions are needed to draw 
important conclusions on the effectiveness of different development interventions (Save-
doff et al., 2006; White, 2010; Cameron et al. 2016).
2.3 Aid effectiveness in fragile contexts
The new economics of aid stresses the importance of good governance to successfully 
achieve growth. Focusing on good governance leads to country selectivity such that trans-
fers are targeted at countries that pass the good-policy test. This means aid is shifted from 
project financing to budget financing. However, targeting countries with high institutional 
and policy scores means that poor individuals in countries with failed states and in post-
conflict societies will not be reached. The problem of building a developmental state that 
qualifies for aid is also left open. Social development funds, local governments, and NGOs 
therefore play an important role: they can bypass central governments while capacity 
building for improved governance goes on.
Traditional empirical research has largely dismissed the analysis of fragile or conflict 
contexts. For instance, econometric evidence used in the aid-effectiveness debate suggests 
that the ineffectiveness of aid is due to the failure of the recipient governments to create 
the right policy environment. However, this data uses a cross-section of countries with-
out any specific focus on fragility contexts that, at best, were treated as a dummy variable 
in the regressions (Boone, 1995; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dal-
gaard and Hansen, 2001; Easterly et al., 2004; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009). The same 
reduced-form approach based on country aggregate data has been adopted in more recent 
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literature on the “growth-efficient” level of aid.6 The literature found that the relationship 
between aid and growth takes on an inverted-U shape for both fragile and non-fragile 
countries, identifying a lower growth-efficient level of aid in the former as compared to 
the latter (Gomanee et al., 2005; McGillivray et al., 2006; McGillivray and Feeny, 2008; 
Feeny and McGillivray, 2009; Naudé et al., 2011).
Existing evidence from impact evaluations in fragile contexts is equally poorly devel-
oped. A recent evidence gap map review of impact evaluations found little to no evidence 
on most categories related to the five Peace-building and State-building Goals. Only two 
Goals (community-driven reconstruction and psycho-social programs for victims) had a 
large enough number of studies to be promising for evidence synthesis. While prioritiz-
ing new research in understudied areas might help fill such knowledge gaps, the nature 
of experiments also imposes limits on what is studied. In addition to the common limita-
tions of randomized studies (cf. section 2.2), some interventions may be impractical or 
unethical in fragile/conflict contexts (Humphreys, 2015). Some authors therefore look 
beyond the standard impact evaluation approach, choosing instead to focus on the drivers 
of success in fragile contexts by developing comprehensive theories that identify impor-
tant factors and establish how they interact to create outcomes. The authors then test or 
demonstrate the plausibility of their arguments through case studies (cf., for example, 
Guisselquist, 2015).
Addison (2000) was one of the first in the field to discuss the role of aid before, dur-
ing, and after armed conflicts. He found that aid distributed during conflicts plays a minor 
yet positive role in humanitarian assistance as well as in the transition from war to peace. 
There are, however, serious problems in operating in wartime environments. This author 
notes that aid can complicate conflicts when it falls into the hands of belligerents. After 
periods of war, aid plays a major role in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Finally, 
Addison considers the possibility of using aid to prevent conflict in areas at risk, arguing 
that foreign policy support should incorporate aid in conflict prevention efforts. Such aid 
should focus on reducing poverty and inequality to dampen social tensions as well as sup-
port institutions and processes for conflict resolution.
More recently, Guisselquist (2015) argued that development assistance to fragile states 
and conflict areas can act as a core component of peacebuilding by providing support for 
the restoration of government functions, the delivery of basic services, the rule of law 
and economic revitalization. Significant gaps exist regarding what has worked, why it has 
worked and the transferability and scalability of such findings. Nevertheless, three broad 
factors can identify why some interventions work better than others. The first is the area 
of intervention and the related degree of engagement with local state institutions. The sec-
ond factor relates to local contextual elements, including windows of opportunity, capacity 
and the existence of local supporters. Finally, the third set of factors deals with project 
or program design and management. While the third set of factors is largely transferrable 
and scalable, the first two are less so and should be considered carefully when assessing 
the feasibility of extending project or program models to new contexts. Area of interven-
tion, degree of engagement with domestic institutions and local contextual elements are 
6 The so-called “growth-efficient” level of aid is the level of aid beyond which more aid is associated with lower 
growth.
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vital factors to consider when making adjustments to improve the viability of development 
programs. 
Finally, a more radical approach was proposed by authors adopting a political econo-
my perspective to analyze the workings of aid in conflict contexts (Murshed, 2002; Sogge, 
2002; Kanafani and Al-Botmeh, 2008; Hever, 2010; Taghdisi-Rad, 2011 and 2015). The 
authors argue that the debate on aid effectiveness in fragile contexts has treated conflict 
as an external factor to be considered only at a much later stage in the analysis. They 
believe that a conflict and its interaction with local socio-economic structures should 
instead be the starting point of the analysis. As Taghdisi-Rad (2015: 5) said, it is impera-
tive to understand “the nature of [a] conflict and the ideological forces behind its con-
tinuation … to construct a framework for the analysis of economic performance under 
any given conflict”.
3. Assistance to Palestinian Households
3.1 West Bank and Gaza Strip: a fragile and protracted crisis context
The world’s longest on-going crisis is in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, marked by 
more than fifty years of occupation, repeated waves of violence, and wars. The last two 
decades of Palestinian history have been marked by the construction of a separation bar-
rier, the closure of the Gaza Strip in 2007, three devastating conflicts in 2008/2009, 2012 
and 2014 respectively, as well as the increasing territorial fragmentation resulting from the 
continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.  The hope for greater welfare 
and stable economic growth brought about by the Oslo Accords (1993-95) has withered as 
a result of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.7 Moreover, a growing political divide 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip has further destabilized the economy.
The attainment of Palestinian economic development is largely dependent on eco-
nomic relations with Israel. According to the Paris Protocol, the Palestinian economy 
works under the framework of a customs and monetary union with Israel (Hever, 2015; 
UNCTAD, 2015).8 The Palestinian government cannot exert power over its borders nor 
7 The Oslo Peace Accords, under which the Palestinian Authority (PA) was created in 1994, were intended to 
lead to a final negotiated settlement between the parties. The accords led to several administrative and security 
arrangements for different parts of the West Bank, which became divided in Areas A, B and C, with the PA 
having civil and security authority only in Area A (which accounts for 18% of the West Bank) and no author-
ity whatsoever in Jerusalem. These were meant to be provisional terms, pending a final negotiated settlement. 
Permanent issues such as the status of Jerusalem, security arrangements, international borders, and the rights of 
Palestine refugees (5 million Palestine refugees are to this day dispersed across the Middle East) were left to be 
resolved after a five year interim period that ended in 1999. Twenty-five years after the Oslo Accords, no pro-
gress has been made to settle the aforementioned pending issues (EU Commission, 2018). 
8 The Protocol on Economic Relations, also called the Paris Protocol, is an agreement between Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization signed in April 1994. It was incorporated into the Oslo II Accord of September 
1995 with minor emendations. Originally, the Paris Protocol was to remain in force for an interim period of five 
years, yet it is still being enforced today. Essentially, the Protocol integrated the Palestinian economy into the 
Israeli economy through a customs union where Israel controls both Israeli and Palestinian borders (Elkhafif et 
al., 2014). The Protocol regulates the relationship and interaction between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 
six major areas, namely: customs, taxes, labour, agriculture, industry and tourism. 
31The impact of assistance on poverty and food security in a fragile and protracted-crisis context
does it have an independent monetary policy.9 Economic growth suffers as a result of 
restrictions and controls placed on the movement of people and goods, access to resources 
such as land and water and access to productive inputs and markets. The Palestinian gov-
ernment has limited ability of collecting its own taxes, while Israel recurrently withholds 
revenues collected on behalf of the  Palestinians. Consequently Palestinian public financ-
es are seriously destabilized. The situation is further complicated by the internal political 
divide that further limits the sovereignty of the Palestinian government. In such a situa-
tion, the scope and geographical coverage of policy interventions has limited effectiveness.
As long as barriers to trade, access, and movement remain high, the Palestinian econ-
omy will continue on its current path of low growth.10 The Palestinian economy grew on 
average 5.5% per year over the last decade, with a marked difference between the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The economy slowed down in the last few years, so much so that 
2017 estimates project GDP to fall from 3.1% to 1.7% per year in the medium-run (IMF, 
2018). This is mostly due to the reduction of donor flows and the possibility of running 
tensions increasing further. With an expected population growth as high as 2.8% in 2017, 
the aforementioned implies a stagnation, if not a contraction, of per-capita incomes. 
Unemployment continues to be high (27.8% in 2017) and labor force participation con-
tinues to be low, with structural unemployment particularly affecting young people and 
women: only 41% of youth between 15 and 29 years of age are active in the labor mar-
ket while only 19% of women are active. Household and government consumption are the 
main drivers of economic activity. The two crowd out the investment necessary for faster 
growth. Primary capital inflows into Palestine are remittances and development assistance 
rather than FDI. Meanwhile, the national economy is highly import-dependent, Israel 
remaining by far its main trading partner. 
Overall, the Palestinian economy is still highly aid-dependent despite a sharp decline 
in aid. UNCTAD (2018) found that international developmental support to Palestine in 
2017 amounted to USD 720 million, only one third of the USD 2 billion received in in 
2008. Over the same period, budget support shrank from USD 1.8 billion to USD 544 
million, a 70% decrease.11 Moreover, the fiscal burden of humanitarian crises and occu-
pation-related fiscal losses have diverted donor aid from development to humanitarian 
interventions and budget support. As emphasized by UNCTAD (2015), no amount of 
aid would have been sufficient to put any economy on a path of sustainable development 
under conditions of frequent military escalations.
Poverty and low standards of living are increasing in Palestine. The poverty headcount 
ratio at the national poverty line was estimated to be 29.2% in 2017 (PCBS, 2018a), well 
above the 2011 poverty headcount ratio of 25.8%. The proportion of poor in 2017 stood 
at 13.9% in the West Bank and 53.0% in the Gaza Strip. In that year, about 16.8% of Pal-
estinians lived in extreme poverty (almost four percentage points more than in 2011), 
9 The agreement defined specific arrangements through which the Government of Israel collects VAT, import 
duties and other so-called clearance (custom) revenues on behalf of the PA, sharing it with the latter on a 
monthly basis. These revenues account for 73% of the PA’s total net revenues (EU Commission, 2018).
10 World Bank (2017) estimates indicate that removing Israeli restrictions could increase annual GDP growth up 
to 10%.
11 The recent decision made by the United States to halt financial assistance to the Palestinian government and to 
UNRWA compounds an already critical situation.
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with 5.8% residing in the West Bank and 33.8% in the Gaza Strip. The increase in overall 
poverty percentages between 2011 and 2017 is explained by the combined effect of two 
diverging dynamics: standards of living dramatically worsened in Gaza Strip, causing a 
rise in the poverty rate of 15 percentage points while poverty decreased by four percent-
age points in the West Bank. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), four out of five people living in Gaza’s 
are currently aid-dependent.
Food and nutrition security are closely related to poverty. According to the Socio-
Economic and Food Security Survey (FSS-PCBS, 2016), in 2014, 26.8% of total house-
holds were classified as severely or moderately food insecure12. According to the Food 
Insecurity Experience Scale (FAO-IFAD-UNICEF-WFP-WHO, 2017), the prevalence 
of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population was 29.9% between 2014-16, 
of which 9.5% represented severe food insecurity. Stunting (or height-for-age) stood 
at 7.4% for children under the age of five in 2014-2016, while the prevalence of wasting 
(or weight-for height) was only 1.2%. Palestinians also face malnutrition: the prevalence 
of overweight youth was 8.2% among children under 5 years of age in 2014-2016 (FAO-
IFAD-UNICEF-WFP-WHO, 2017). Micronutrient deficiency is also a concern among vul-
nerable population groups, such as pregnant or lactating women and children.
3.2 An overview of assistance modalities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Palestinians are vulnerable to many risks. According to OCHA (2018), the most criti-
cal ones are the following: (i) the risk of conflict and violence, forcible displacement, and 
the denial of access to natural resources, inputs and markets that affect 2 million people 
in need of protection assistance; (ii) risks associated with poor water quality, poor waste-
water collection and treatment, and lack of proper hygiene practices that affect 1.9 million 
people; (iii) the risks of food insecurity faced by 1.7 million people; and (iv) 1.2 million 
people are exposed to health and nutrition risks (e.g. conflict-related trauma casualties, 
pregnant and lactating women, children under the age of five, people with disability and 
elderly, etc.). Although all Palestinians are negatively impacted by the conflict, some of 
them – such as 1.4 million refugees, the 1.6 million Gazan civilians in need, and 0.4 mil-
lion individuals living in Area C – are more severely affected (UNSCO, 2016). 
In the face of economic de-development and the denial of autonomous development 
prospects, humanitarian and development actors increasingly recognize the importance of 
bridging the humanitarian-development divide in Palestine. The result is a combination of 
emergency response measures with longer-term interventions to better address the causes 
of vulnerabilities faced by the Palestinian population (Diakonia, 2018).13 Many vulnerable 
12 Preliminary results of the last SEFSec (PCBS, 2018b) show that the share of households classified as severely or 
moderately food insecure has increased by 6.2% between 2014 and 2018.
13 The protracted nature of the crisis and the dismal prospects for positive change have led to a considerable 
degree of critical reflection across the nexus from different perspectives and actors in WBGS. The UN notes that 
“humanitarian action extends to less traditional areas of intervention and calls for a much closer collaboration 
between humanitarian actors and the government” (UNSCO, 2016: 17). Along the same lines, the Humanitarian 
Response Plan for 2018 (OCHA, 2017a: 7 and 30) recognizes that “key drivers of vulnerability are common to 
both the humanitarian and development needs”. As noted by the Mapping and Synthesis of Evaluations carried 
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groups have been identified as beneficiaries of both humanitarian and development inter-
ventions, both of which must occur simultaneously in order to be effective. Humanitarian 
and development programming are increasingly aligned in order to provide durable and 
sustainable assistance capable of building resilience and reducing vulnerability. In other 
words, a blend of interventions tends in practice to prevail on a strict divide between 
humanitarian and development interventions, leveraging on the “humanitarian-develop-
ment nexus” and operationalizing the so-called “new way of working” (OCHA, 2017b) as 
outlined in the UN Secretary-General’s Report for the World Humanitarian Summit (UN, 
2016). 
The most important modalities of assistance in WBGS are: (i) in-kind provision of 
basic foodstuffs through baskets generally including wheat flour, rice, pulses and vegetable 
oil; (ii) food vouchers for use on selected items with designated merchants; and (iii) cash 
transfers distributed mostly through e-cards for cash disbursements. The aforementioned 
forms of assistance are listed in increasing flexibility, meaning that the mode of assistance 
provides a greater range of choice to targeted households, has cheaper implementation, 
and is less likely to focus on basic needs. Vocational training programs and other forms 
of livelihoods support can also help families rise above the poverty line. Other forms of 
support such as health and housing assistance are also quite important, especially in acute 
crisis (e.g. the 2014 war in Gaza). 
Assistance in Palestine is delivered by many actors. In terms of financial volume, 
major implementing actors include the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNR-
WA), and the World Food Programme (WFP). While a large number of donors sup-
port UNRWA’s activities, the two largest donors to direct assistance are the EU and, until 
2017, the USA. Charities linked to zakat — the payment made under Islamic law on cer-
tain kinds of property used for charitable and religious purposes — as well as assistance 
through de-facto authorities in the Gaza Strip are equally important sources of financial 
inflows (Culbert, 2017).
While modalities of assistance vary between implementing bodies and beneficiary 
groups, selection criteria and program objectives are similar. The principal beneficiary 
selection tools used by actors for food and social assistance are poverty-based, using varia-
tions of a proxy means testing formula.
Institutional structures and political considerations are primary determinants in 
how social security assistance, direct food assistance and cash assistance are defined and 
channeled. Some development donors fund through governmental channels, such as 
the MoSD, while some humanitarian donors fund through humanitarian actors, such as 
UNRWA or WFP. As a result, the current system of delivering assistance is fragmented 
despite recent efforts working towards effective coordination between humanitarian and 
development actors (Culbert, 2017). The recent MoSD’s strategy (MoSD, 2017) holds 
promise in both coordinating and aligning assistance efforts of multiple actors by address-
ing underlying social-economic challenges. However, this strategy remains at an early pol-
icy stage.
out by UNEG (2018: 28), in the occupied Palestinian territories there is recognition that “the scope of program-
ming needs to transcend standard ‘good practice’ in order to mitigate the negative effects of what is likely to be a 
deteriorating situation”.
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3.3 Assistance to Palestinians in 2013-2014
Assistance to the WBGS is composed of a very heterogeneous set of modalities, 
implementing bodies and beneficiary groups, reflecting different conditions at the local 
level as well as between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Types of Assistance
According to SEFSec (FSS-PCBS, 2016), approximately 40% of all Palestinian house-
holds reported receiving at least one type of assistance in 2014. There is a marked dif-
ference in the share of households receiving assistance in Gaza Strip (84%) compared to 
the West Bank (less than 17%) (Table1). Between 2013 and 2014, the share of assisted 
households in the Gaza Strip increased by more than 18%, even greater than the amount 
observed in 2011 (FAO-UNRWA-WFP, 2013). However, the increase in share of assisted 
households between 2013 and 2014 in the West Bank was less than 2%, standing 8 per-
centage points below the level existing in the region in 2011. 
Table1 illustrates the prevalence of in-kind food, cash transfers and food vouchers 
provided to Palestinian households. Between 2013 and 2014, the composition of the vari-
ous types of assistance in the West Bank did not change significantly, while composition 
of assistance in the Gaza Strip underwent important changes. In the West Bank, a large 
share of households reported that “Cash” and “In-kind food” were the two types of the 
assistance they received the most of in 2013 and 2014. On the other hand, the major cat-
Table 1. Share of households receiving assistance by type of assistance and region, 2013-2014.
WBGS West Bank Gaza Strip
2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014
In-kind food 24.6% 28.0% 7.5% 7.6% 57.5% 67.0%
Health care 0.4% 2.3% 0.6% 2.7% 0.2% 1.6%
Clothing 0.7% 2.1% 0.4% 0.3% 1.3% 5.7%
Job creation 1.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 3.2% 0.6%
Compensation martyrs 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4%
Cash 16.8% 16.2% 10.5% 8.3% 28.9% 31.2%
Health insurance 11.5% 7.8% 0.7% 1.2% 32.2% 20.3%
Food vouchers 3.0% 8.2% 2.0% 1.6% 4.7% 20.8%
School feeding 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4%
Productive inputs 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Drinking water 0.4% 1.8% 0.0% 0.1% 1.0% 5.2%
Electricity 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.2%
Housinga - 9.2% - 0.9% - 25.0%
Other 0.6% 1.2% 0.2% 0.0% 1.3% 3.4%
At least one form of assistance 32.4% 39.7% 15.2% 16.5% 65.7% 84.2%
a Not included in the 2013 SEFSec survey.
Source: FSS-PCBS (2016): Table 7.1, modified.
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egories of assistance reported in the Gaza Strip fluctuated between the two years. New 
types of assistance outside the three core types (“In-kind food”, “Cash” and “Health insur-
ance”) were reported in the Gaza Strip. These included “Housing” (shelter, rent, caravan), 
“Food voucher”, “Drinking water” and “Clothing”. All four increased significantly between 
2013 and 2014 in response to worsening living conditions as a result of the armed conflict.
Value of Assistance
In 2014, assisted households received an average of 102 US$/month. However, nation-
al averages mask significant regional differences in both levels and trends. Table 2 reports 
the average monthly value received by households in the two regions for each types of 
assistance during 2012-2014. There was a general decline in the average value of assistance 
for cash and food in the West Bank from 2013 to 2014. Conversely, assistance for employ-
ment and provision of agricultural inputs increased. In the Gaza Strip the average value of 
support increased for many assistance types but food assistance that did not change much. 
Employment assistance represented the largest average allowances given to households in 
2014. Among “Other” forms of support, the largest average values are seen for housing 
and shelter assistance. Support to agricultural production activities almost disappeared in 
Gaza Strip after 2012.
The value of assistance varies across different types of households (Table 3). Support 
to refugee households was slightly greater than that of non-refugee households (107 vs. 
91 US$/month). Moreover, a substantial difference was recorded in 2014 based on gen-
der household heading: female-headed households received on average 30% more support 
than male-headed households (127 vs. 98 US$/month). This reveals that female-headed 
households are more dependent on assistance, probably due to higher vulnerability.
The composition of assistance across different household typologies emphasizes the 
different needs of various groups (Table 3). Female-headed households are more likely to 
receive assistance in the form of cash and free health services than male-headed house-
Table 2. Average value of support by type of assistance, US$/month.
Type of assistance
West Bank Gaza Strip
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014
Cash 115 79 55 95 92 123
In-kind food 45 34 27 37 36 48
Food vouchers 42 43 28 30 48 32
Job creation 115 97 126 82 147 215
Agricultural inputs 46 69 123 129 na 9
Housing na na 231 na na 211
Othera 71 70 135 4 17 110
Average per assisted household 128 96 86 65 102 108
a The “Other” category in years 2012 and 2013 includes also housing.
Source: FSS-PCBS (2016): Table 7.3, modified.
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holds. This is probably due to the demographic composition of the former, with a major-
ity of households headed by widows and elderly women. The comparison between refu-
gee and non-refugee indicates a cash preference by non-refugee households, while refugee 
households receive a larger share of assistance in “Other” forms, including substantial sup-
port for housing.
Sources of Assistance 
Social assistance coverage increased between 2013 and 2014, reflecting deteriorating 
livelihood conditions–especially in the Gaza Strip, where more than four households out 
of five were receiving assistance in 2014. Overall, reported sources of assistance are given 
primarily by the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs (currently renamed the Ministry of 
Social Development, or MoSD), UNRWA, international agencies, charitable and religious 
associations, and informal assistance (family, relatives or friends). However, key differenc-
es are observed between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Table 4). 
In the West Bank, 7% of households reported receiving assistance from the Ministry 
of Social Affairs in 2014, a slightly lower figure than that reported in 2013 (8%). The other 
two most cited sources of assistance in 2014 were UNRWA and informal assistance (fam-
ily and relatives), which remained unchanged from 2013 levels. 
A different picture emerges from the data in the Gaza Strip. Not surprisingly, the larg-
est source of social assistance in 2014 was UNRWA, an organization that provided food 
assistance to some 867,000 refugees. A number of other sources of assistance were report-
ed, including the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, international agencies, charitable 
and religious associations, worker unions, and family and friends. Informal sources of 
social assistance more than halved, dropping to 7% in 2014. This is a clear sign that infor-
mal social networks were unable to help in times of widespread severe hardship caused by 
the war.
Table 3. Composition of assistance by region and household group, share of total value received, 
2014.
Type of support West Bank
Gaza 
Strip Refugee
Non-
refugee
Male-
headed
Female-
headed
Cash 36.4% 34.5% 31.8% 40.2% 34.0% 40.4%
In-kind food 15.3% 26.8% 23.6% 24.7% 25.7% 15.6%
Health insurance 19.8% 0.8% 5.3% 5.0% 3.1% 16.2%
Food vouchers 3.1% 5.5% 4.7% 5.7% 5.5% 2.3%
Housing 13.1% 21.6% 24.4% 12.2% 20.9% 12.9%
Other 0.1% 5.6% 5.5% 2.2% 5.0% 0.7%
Remaining sources 12.2% 5.2% 4.7% 10.0% 5.8% 11.8%
Average per assisted household (US$/month) 86 108 107 91 98 127
Source: FSS-PCBS (2016): Table 7.4, modified.
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4. Poverty and Food Security
The profiling of Palestinian households in terms of poverty quartiles before receiv-
ing assistance shows expected patterns14 (Table 5): moving from poorer to richer house-
holds saw a parallel decrease in household size, an increase in educational attainment, a 
decrease in the dependency ratio, and an increase in the employment rate (including that 
of the head of the household).
Poverty in the WBGS is determined by the employability of household members. 
Food security on the other hand is largely influenced by access dimension, specifically by 
individuals’ labor entitlement. Table 6 therefore provides a detailed account of household 
heads’ labor indicators across poverty quartiles. By and large, poorer households had more 
problematic labor conditions. For instance, household heads who worked fewer hours 
were more likely to be poor, just as irregular employment and lower level occupations 
were more related to poverty. Usually, poverty is correlated to employment in the primary 
and construction sectors. In short, heads of poorer households tend to have more infor-
mal and irregular jobs that do not require high levels of formal skills and/or education, 
such as jobs in basic production sectors.
14 Only the female-headed household share does not show a clear pattern. Another characteristic (not reported 
in the table) that does not change at all is the number of sources of income per household: on average, two per 
household.
Table 4. Reported sources of assistance by Regiona.
West Bank Gaza Strip
2013 2014 2013 2014
Ministry of Social Affairs 8.2% 6.8% 19.6% 23.5%
Other PA agencies 0.9% 2.0% 4.2% 8.6%
Political parties 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 8.6%
Zakat/other religious institutions 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 2.7%
International agencies (excluding UNRWA) 1.4% 1.2% 9.3% 21.3%
UNRWA 2.1% 4.0% 42.6% 62.3%
Arab countries 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 2.8%
Charity/religious 0.4% 0.3% 3.8% 19.5%
Family and relatives 2.8% 2.8% 14.8% 6.8%
Friends/Neighbors 1.1% 0.9% 1.8% 4.8%
Workers union 0.0% 0.0% 21.6% 12.9%
National banks 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5%
Local reform commission 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.6%
Other 0.4% 0.9% 0.3% 3.3%
Any type of assistance 15.2% 16.5% 65.7% 84.2%
a Sources of assistance are not mutually exclusive. Some households reported receiving assistance 
from more than one source.
Source: FSS-PCBS (2016): Table 7.5.
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As expected, there is a direct relationship between poverty and food insecurity (Table 
7). This is measured by the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and the Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), two proxies for the qualitative and quantitative dimen-
Table 5. Households’ profile per poverty quartile, 2013.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
Average household size 7.7 5.2 4.8 4.5 5.6
Share of HH with female head 6.4% 11.5% 11.4% 9.1% 9.6%
Share of HH with head with secondary education or above 28.1% 34.2% 39.1% 51.0% 38.1%
Global dependency ratio 1.20 1.19 1.02 0.90 1.08
Share of HH whose head does not work 28.9% 28.4% 23.5% 22.4% 25.8%
Household employment rate 32.1% 36.9% 40.5% 43.7% 38.3%
Authors’ elaboration on SEFSec 2014 data.
Table 6. Head of household employment statistics per poverty quartile, 2013.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
Working Status          
Employed from 1-14 hours 5.1% 4.6% 2.5% 1.3% 4.2%
Employed 15-34 hours 6.1% 6.9% 5.1% 3.2% 6.0%
Employed 35 hours and over 41.7% 46.5% 58.5% 63.5% 47.7%
Temporarily absent 14.6% 10.6% 6.6% 3.9% 11.2%
Looked for a job (already worked) 6.9% 3.9% 1.2% 2.1% 4.6%
Looked for a job (never worked) 2.1% 2.6% 0.7% 1.1% 1.9%
Did not look for work because of frustration 0.7% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7%
Full time student 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Housewife 4.0% 5.0% 4.9% 3.4% 4.4%
Unable to work 16.8% 14.7% 12.8% 8.1% 14.8%
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Professional Status
Employer 2.4% 2.2% 3.9% 11.9% 5.1%
Self-employed 11.3% 11.5% 12.4% 13.9% 12.3%
Unpaid family worker 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2%
Waged employee 61.9% 59.9% 60.5% 52.2% 58.6%
Sector of employment
Agriculture, fishing and forestry 8.7% 6.7% 3.5% 2.2% 5.3%
Mining, quarrying and manufacturing 6.5% 8.6% 11.5% 13.6% 10.0%
Construction 18.2% 16.7% 16.3% 12.6% 16.0%
Commerce, restaurants and hotels 10.9% 11.2% 14.6% 20.2% 14.2%
Transportation, storage and communication 7.2% 5.5% 6.1% 5.1% 6.0%
Services and other activities 24.3% 24.9% 25.1% 24.5% 24.7%
Authors’ elaboration on SEFSec 2014 data.
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sions of food security, respectively (cf. section 5.1). Probably the most striking indicator 
related to poverty is the share of households receiving assistance. This value encompasses 
almost two thirds of all households in the lowest quartile and 7.6% of households in the 
highest quartile. Both indicators of food security show the expected regularities in that 
poorer households have lower FCS values. Meanwhile, poorer households have larger 
shares of poor or borderline FCS (Q1 three times larger than that of Q4) as well as insuf-
ficient dietary quantities (HFIAS in Q1 eight times larger than that of Q4). Quite surpris-
ingly, the average value of assistance rapidly decreases from the lowest to the second-low-
est quartile, but then increases again in the two higher quartiles15.
5. Data and methods 
5.1 Data 
The Socio-Economic and Food Security (SEFSec) survey has been administered since 
2009 to monitor the status of food security among Palestinian households. The SEFSec 
methodology accounts for the multi-dimensional drivers of food insecurity in WBGS by 
exploring topics such as asset-based poverty, food consumption, and resilience. This is done 
to capture the capacity households have to adapt, transform and cope with shocks. Besides 
these three main pillars, the questionnaire collects data on aspects such as socio-demo-
graphics, assistance, expenditure and consumption, all of which are useful for the analysis. 
The dataset includes data from the fifth and sixth SEFSec surveys. Data collection 
took place in 2014 and 2015, with a reference period covering the six months preceding 
the interview (the second half of 2013 and 2014, respectively). The 2013 SEFSec survey 
was conducted on a sample of 7,503 households (4,949 in the West Bank and 2,554 in the 
Gaza Strip), while the 2014 sample included 8,177 households (5,047 in the West Bank 
and 3,130 in the Gaza Strip). The samples are representative for various levels of disag-
gregation, including gender, refugee status, governorate, locality type (i.e. urban, rural and 
refugee camp) and, for the West Bank only, Areas A/B and C (FSS-PCBS, 2016). 
An important feature of the 2013-2014 SEFSec is that 92% of the households inter-
viewed in 2013 were included also in the 2014 wave. Therefore, a sample of 6,881 units 
15 However, this seems to be related to the higher average value of assistance in the West Bank to households that 
own some type of business: essentially, it is a support to investment that is able to generate employment.
Table 7. Households’ assistance and food security status per poverty quartile, 2013.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
Per capita expenditure (NIS/month) 305 461 593 860 554
Share of HH receiving assistance 62.5% 41.8% 21.3% 7.6% 33.3%
Average value of assistance per HH (NIS/month) 418 293 347 321 368
Households with insufficient dietary quantity (HFIAS) 50.7% 29.3% 14.8% 6.4% 25.3%
Households with poor or borderline FCS 30.4% 26.4% 17.8% 10.2% 21.2%
Average household FCS 70 72 76 80 74
Authors’ elaboration on SEFSec 2014 data.
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(4,454 in the West Bank and 2,427 in the Gaza Strip) can be used to analyze the impact of 
assistance on Palestinian households through the panel structure of the dataset.
The main variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 8. They include the 
three outcome variables of interest: a measure of poverty and two measures of food secu-
rity (i.e. HFIAS and FCS, the latter also broken down in its main components), a set of 
household socio-demographics that are the usual correlates used to analyze the outcomes, 
and some geographical dummies to account for regional/residence differences used to 
capture any unobserved heterogeneity.16
Poverty outcomes are measured as an asset-based poverty index closely related to 
living standards. An asset-based poverty index better reflects long-term wealth over an 
expenditure-based poverty index, a short-term measure which in principle would work 
better in an impact evaluation of aid effectiveness. Additionally, the asset-based pover-
ty index was chosen since total household expenditure is not accurately sampled by the 
SEFSec questionnaire. Indeed, an assessment commissioned by SEFSec administrators to 
evaluate the robustness and reliability of expenditure-based poverty measures resulted 
in the decision to abandon money-based (i.e. expenditure) measures of poverty because 
they were inconsistent with similar measures based on benchmark data from the Palestine 
Expenditure and Consumption Survey of 2011 (PECS) (Langworthy et al., 2014; Smith, 
2014).17 Furthermore, in the context of protracted crisis such as the currently ongoing one 
in Palestine, assistance becomes a key source of income for the majority of households, 
establishing itself as a “structural” component of household income. Assistance has sig-
nificantly contributed to building household assets over the years and helps maintain a 
given level of standards of living via consumption smoothing. If assistance to households 
decreases, household assets would decrease in response because the household sells its 
assets to countervail the reduction in assistance.
Food security is proxied by two measures, namely the Household Food Insecuri-
ty Access Scale (HFIAS), a quantitative measure of the dimension of food consumption 
(Coates et al., 2007), and the Food Consumption Score (FCS) that captures the quality 
of household diets (WFP, 2008). HFIAS is an indicator based on responses to nine ques-
tions, five of which relate to the size and frequency of meals consumed in the 30 days 
preceding the survey. HFIAS is value ranging from 0 to 27, where a higher score indicates 
an insufficient dietary quantity. FCS is an indicator based on the number of days specific 
food groups are consumed in the seven days preceding the survey. The FCS is a continu-
ous score where a value less than or equal to 45 or between 45 and 62 respectively indi-
cate poor or borderline food consumption. This value is obtained by assigning a specific 
weight to each food group in accordance to its contribution to dietary quality.
16 The variables listed in Table 3.1 are the ones actually used in the following analysis, that is they are only a 
subset of the wider set of candidate variables that in principle could be used. Unfortunately, the SEFSec survey 
is designed only to monitor the evolution of food security in Palestine. As such it does neither have the wealth 
of variables that can be usually found in a standard multi-purpose survey (e.g. household cultural traits, house-
hold behavior other than food consumption, etc.), nor the depth of data typical of household expenditure/con-
sumption surveys (e.g. detailed information on household expenditures, food consumption composition, etc.).
17 The overall conclusion of these studies was that “in the absence of other options, an asset-based measure of 
poverty can thus serve as a valid, stand-alone measure for the purposes of the SEFSec food insecurity analysis.” 
(Smith, 2014: 21). 
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The pros and cons of these two indicators have been assessed in several review and 
validation studies of food security indicators (Carletto et al., 2013). IFPRI (2006) con-
cluded that the FCS weighting system for the food frequency scores might not be able to 
accommodate variations across space and time. Nevertheless, IFPRI found positive associ-
ations between FCS values and caloric consumption per capita in some studies. The infor-
mation generated by HFIAS is used to assess the prevalence of household food security 
and detect changes over time. Moreover, validations conducted in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa (Melgar-Quinonez et al., 2006; Knueppel et al., 2010) found that the indi-
cator demonstrated reliability and validity in the local contexts in which it was deployed. 
Table 8. Summary statistics of key variables.
Variable Meaning Mean Standard deviation Min max
l_ass_index Log of asset based poverty index 7.09 0.33 5.52 8.28
fcs Food consumption score (FCS) 74.28 17.06 0.00 112.00
hfias Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) score 4.64 6.56 0.00 27.00
vegfru_fcs FCS cereals, tubers, pulses, vegetable and fruit 26.96 4.93 0.00 49.00
meatmilk_fcs FCS meat and milk 40.85 14.65 0.00 56.00
oilsug_fcs FCS fats and sugar 6.46 1.13 0.00 7.00
mass log of HH monthly assistance 1.96 2.63 0.00 10.82
ydum dummy for year 2014 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
massy interaction mass*ydum 1.04 2.12 0.00 10.82
lhsize Log of household size 1.81 0.42 0.69 3.30
lexp Log of household monthly expenditure (NIS) 7.72 0.75 1.79 11.16
dep_ratio Dependency ratio (aged 0-15+aged >65)/aged 15-65 1.10 1.34 0.00 7.00
rat_emp % of employed people aged >15 in the HH 0.37 0.24 0.00 1.00
agehead Age of HH head (years) 45.34 14.37 19.00 98.00
femhead HH head gender (female = 1) 9.66%   0 1
head_ref HH head status (refugee = 1) 41%   0 1
high_ed HH head education (secondary education or higher = 1) 38.12%   0 1
employed HH head occupational status (employed = 1) 70.42%   0 1
qly_deprived HH with low FCS (< 61) (yes = 1) 22.26%   0 1
qty_deprived HH with insufficient food intake, HFIAS (yes = 1) 23.21%   0 1
ass HH receiving assistance (yes = 1) 37.71%   0 1
WB North Regional dummy (West Bank North = 1) 27.58%   0 1
WB Center Regional dummy (West Bank Center = 1) 17.69%   0 1
WB South Regional dummy (West Bank South = 1) 19.46%   0 1
GS North Regional dummy (Gaza Strip North = 1) 18.47%   0 1
GS Center Regional dummy (Gaza Strip Center = 1) 5.19%   0 1
GS South Regional dummy (Gaza Strip South = 1) 11.61%   0 1
rural Locality of residence (rural = 1) 18.62%   0 1
camp Locality of residence (refugee camp = 1) 9.74%   0 1
urban Locality of residence (urban = 1) 71.64%   0 1
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Besides the considerations above, the SEFSec dataset does not include enough data to 
build other food security indicators such as the food caloric intake.
5.2 Methods
To estimate the impact of assistance on a given dimension of well-being, such as pov-
erty or food security, we need to control for possible unobserved heterogeneity in partici-
pation in the assistance program. Due to the targeting strategies of the different agencies 
that provide assistance to Palestinian households, treated households are quite different 
from untreated ones. Notably, the probability of receiving assistance is correlated with a 
set of characteristics mostly related to poverty (cf. section 4). As a result, the selection bias 
is likely to be pervasive (Khandker et al., 2010). Moreover, further unobserved targeting 
variables may affect both the outcome variable and the probability to receive assistance. 
Building on the panel structure of SEFSec dataset, we used a difference-in-difference 
(DD) approach to get rid of aforementioned biases. The DD model assumes that the het-
erogeneity in participation is fundamentally time invariant once conditioned on a set of 
household characteristics (X):
E(Y0t – Y0t-1 | T = 1,X) = E(Y0t – Y0t-1 | T = 0,X) (1)
where Y0t is the potential outcome without the treatment measured at time t. T is the 
treatment status, which equals to 1 if the household received assistance and 0 otherwise. 
The assumption of time invariant heterogeneity implies that the dynamics observed in 
the control group are the same as the ones observed in the treated group had the latter 
not been treated. Unfortunately, the SEFSec dataset does not allow testing for the “parallel 
trend” hypothesis. However, considering the short time distance between the two SEFSec 
waves, the risk that this assumption does not hold is low.
In regression form the DD estimator is given by:
Yi,t = αi + βTi + γt + δTit + ∑ζXi,t + εi,t (2)
where t is a time dummy (1 in the second period, 0 otherwise). Ti is the treatment dum-
my, with a value of 1 for the treatment group and 0 for the control. The casual effect of the 
treatment is assumed to be additive. In the classical DD model, the δ parameter — which 
is associated with the interaction term between the treatment Ti and the time dummy var-
iable t — identifies the expected impact (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
The traditional DD regression uses dichotomic (i.e. treated/non-treated) treatment 
variables. However, continuous treatment variables measuring the intensity of the treat-
ment can be also used (Card, 1992; Acemoglu et al., 2004). Continuous variables fully 
exploit the information content of available data. For the purpose of this study, the most 
suitable candidate is the monthly value of assistance received by the household. In this 
case, it can be demonstrated that for the i-th household the δ parameter is equivalent to:
δ = 
(Yi1 – Yi0 | Ti = Ti1,Xi) – (Yi1 – Yi0 | Ti = Ti0,Xi)   (3)
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where the numerator is the difference in outcome variation over time given the final and 
initial values of the continuous intervention variable and the denominator is the difference 
between the final and the initial value of the continuous treatment variable. In the case of 
an increase of the continuous treatment variable between the two periods, a positive value 
of δ indicates that the increased treatment intensity determines a higher increase of the 
outcome variable. This implies that the impact of the treatment is positive.
Moreover, thanks to the time dimension of the panel, we can include in (2) household 
specific intercepts or fixed effect, αi. Irrespective of the adopted fixed effect estimator, this 
is equivalent to including a dummy variable for each household in equation (2) (Wool-
dridge, 2013). Equation (3) will still hold provided that we condition on both X and αi.
The key identifying assumption in this context is that treatment intensity is not cor-
related with individual unobserved trends, although it can correlate with individual per-
manent characteristics. We posit that the intensity of assistance (“mass”, measured in log-
arithms) impacts the outcome variable, i.e. either the log of poverty asset index (“l_ass-
index”) or one of the food security indicators (“hfias” or “fcs”). The intensity of assistance 
and the outcome variable are both affected by a set of household characteristics that we 
assume to be time-invariant, including location, refugee status, and education of the head 
of household. All of these are captured by αi. We further conditioned on potential time 
variant confounders such as dependency ratio, household size, ratio of employed house-
hold members to the number of household members of working age, and employment 
status of the head of the household. In the case of poverty models potential endogeneity 
may remain even after having conditioned on the fixed effects due to the nature of the 
targeting process. Therefore, we implemented the 2SLS version of both the pooled OLS 
and the fixed effect estimators. In the case of food security indicators, we can assume that 
regressors are exogenous because targeting is made on poverty, not on food security indi-
cators. 
Noticeably, in the case of the HFIAS score, we have to deal with a censored variable 
whose distribution has a clear peak at zero. In such a case the fixed effects tobit model 
estimates would be affected by the so-called “incidental parameters” problem especially 
in case of short time panel datasets (Greene, 2004). To ensure consistency with the fixed 
effect models of continuous outcome variables (asset-based poverty index and FCS), in 
the case of HFIAS model we used the semi-parametric estimator of fixed effect tobit mod-
els proposed by Honoré (1992), which is consistent and asymptotically normal even for 
time dimension of 2 as in our case.
6. Results
We first run a pooled OLS regression using a sandwich estimator of the covariance 
matrix. Results in the case of the asset-based poverty index18 are reported in the first two 
columns of Table 9. All independent variable parameters except for a few regional dum-
mies are significant at p=0.05. Both the household size and the dependency ratio affect 
the index negatively, while the ratio of employed household members over working age 
18 The dependent variable – i.e., the log of the asset-based poverty index – is built in such a way a higher index 
value corresponds to wealthier households. This should be considered when interpreting the results in Table 9. 
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household members shows a clear positive effect. This confirms that poverty is mostly a 
matter of (a lack of) employability. The characteristics of head of households that positive-
ly impact the index are the following: education, age, employment status, refugee status or 
living in the West Bank. On the other hand, households situated in rural areas and refugee 
camps negatively impact the outcome variable. All estimates have expected signs: higher 
educational attainment, employment and living in the West Bank over the Gaza Strip all 
decrease the chances that a household is poor. Conversely, holding refugee status or living 
far away from an urban center increases the likelihood of being poor.
The impact denoting the intensity of assistance is captured by the interaction term 
“massy”. The value of monthly assistance positively impacts the asset-based poverty index. 
Table 9. Asset-based poverty index regression models, Palestine.
Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effect Fixed Effect IV
Coef. Student’s t Coef. z Coef. Student’s t Coef. z
massa -0.03 -24.96 -0.03 -25.33 -0.02 -15.56 -0.02 -15.07
ydum -0.01 -1.89 -0.01 -1.91 -0.03 -5.18 -0.03 -5.07
massya 0.00 2.06 0.00 2.11 0.01 6.04 0.01 5.75
lhsize -0.31 -54.19 -0.31 -54.22 -0.27 -37.46 -0.27 -37.47
dep_ratio -0.02 -14.26 -0.02 -14.23 -0.02 -10.77 -0.02 -10.77
rat_emp 0.10 8.53 0.10 8.47 0.15 12.29 0.15 12.32
employed 0.04 5.55 0.03 5.35 -0.01 -4.20 -0.01 -4.20
agehead 0.00 10.45 0.00 10.42      
refhead 0.04 8.5 0.04 8.47        
femhead -0.02 -2.77 -0.02 -2.70        
high_ed 0.09 19.05 0.09 18.85        
WB North 0.13 13.33 0.12 12.84        
WB Center 0.23 22.58 0.23 21.98        
WB South 0.09 9.25 0.09 8.83        
GS North -0.01 -1.01 -0.01 -1.05        
GS Centerb                
GS South -0.01 -1.03 -0.01 -1.01        
rural -0.10 -16.06 -0.10 -15.98        
camp -0.04 -5.06 -0.03 -5.01        
constant 7.44 417 7.45 415.01        
R2 0.45       0.36      
KP rk under-identification ChiSq p=0.00
CD Wald F >350 >350
HJ over-identification ChiSq exactly id. exactly id.
IV (excluded) ass, assy   ass, assy  
F test of fixed effect         1.8 p=0.00    
a This variable has been instrumented; b GS Center, where Gaza City is located, is assumed as reference. 
Note: KP is the Kleibergen-Paap LM test for under-identification of the model; CD is the Cragg Donald weak 
identification test; HJ is the Hansen J statistics for over-identification of the model (cf. Baum et al., 2007).
45The impact of assistance on poverty and food security in a fragile and protracted-crisis context
However, despite being statistically significant, the coefficient estimate is close to 0. To 
deal with possible endogeneity, we performed a pooled 2SLS instrumenting the variable 
and the interaction term with dummies for assistance and its interaction with time. How-
ever, the size of the coefficient of the interaction term does not change in the case of 2SLS.
In order to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity, we run a fixed effect 
regression. This is done because the Hausmann test rejected the hypothesis of absence 
of correlation between random effects and regressors. Table 9 reports the parameter esti-
mates obtained with the fixed effect estimator on transformed data as deviations from the 
group means.19 We also implemented the corresponding 2SLS version for the fixed effect 
estimator using the same instruments employed in the pooled model (last two columns 
of Table 9). All time-invariant regressors are perfectly correlated with the household 
specific intercepts, therefore only the time varying variables are considered in the fixed 
effect models: dependency ratio, household size, ratio of employed household members 
to working age members, and employment status of household head. Both models con-
firm that the intensity of assistance has a significant effect in reducing household poverty. 
In all the models, the coefficients of the interaction term are statistically significant stable 
around 0.01: a 10% increase of assistance on average leads to a direct 0.1% increase of the 
asset-based index. 
To take into account the fact that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are physically, 
politically and economically apart, we estimated the impact of assistance separately for the 
two regions (Table 10 and 11, respectively). As expected, the impact is significantly posi-
tive in the West Bank and of the same order of magnitude as Palestine as a whole (Table 
9). This was true after having accounted for individual heterogeneity.
Quite surprisingly, we obtained a non-significant impact of assistance in the Gaza 
Strip. This seems related to the very peculiar situation present in Gaza. In 2014, more 
than four households out of five received assistance (cf. section 3.3), largely irrespective 
of the household characteristics.20 This was done in order to offset the region’s widespread 
humanitarian crisis resulting from a ten-year long blockade and generalized “de-devel-
opment” (UNCTAD, 2017). To make matters worse, a series of military operations took 
place over the last decade, ultimately culminating in the devastating war of July-August 
2014 — exactly during the second period surveyed. This is likely to have blurred the caus-
al relationship between assistance and poverty.
The estimates in the case of HFIAS show the expected signs.21 In the models for Pal-
estine as a whole (Table 12), the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative 
in the simple pooled OLS model as well as in models addressing the censored nature of 
the HFIAS variable. This means that assistance has a significant positive impact in ensur-
19 With this transformation we get rid of the large number of group dummies that would be included in the least 
square dummy variable estimator had the transformation not being made (Baltagi, 2005). 
20 The poverty headcount ratio in the Gaza Strip is 53.0% while one third of population (33.8%) lives in extreme 
poverty according to monthly consumption patterns (PCBS, 2018a). According to Atamanov and Palaniswamy 
(2018) more than 90% of the bottom 40% in the Gaza Strip receive some form of aid; and even among the most 
well-off, half receive assistance. Another anecdotal evidence of the generalized humanitarian crisis is the higher 
concentration around the mean of average assistance per household in Gaza Strip vis-à-vis West Bank with the 
latter having a coefficient of variation that is five times larger than the former.
21 HFIAS is a measure of quantity deprivation of food showing higher scores the lesser the food consumed by the 
household.
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ing the consumption of adequate quantities of food. Moreover, being a refugee, employed, 
well-educated, younger household head reduces household food insecurity. 
Regional models tell the same story, although it is worth noting that the impact of 
assistance is much stronger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. This confirms the key 
role of assistance to ensure food security in a humanitarian crisis context such as the Gaza 
Strip, where two third of households receive in-kind food assistance and one fifth of sur-
veyed households received food vouchers (cf. Table 1). In the West Bank, households have 
a wider portfolio of coping strategies available to them, including non-assistance strategies. 
Both regions have marked sub-regional differences. The governorates of the two main 
economic centers – Ramallah and East Jerusalem in the West Bank and Gaza City in the 
Table 10. Asset-based poverty index regression models, West Bank.
Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effect Fixed Effect IV
Coef. Student’s t Coef. z Coef. Student’s t Coef. z
massa -0.03 -16.29 -0.03 -17.15 -0.02 -10.01 -0.03 -10.15
ydum -0.02 -3.02 -0.02 -3.01 -0.03 -5.55 -0.03 -5.42
massya 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.47 0.01 3.61 0.01 3.34
lhsize -0.30 -38.49 -0.30 -38.49 -0.23 -25.1 -0.23 -25.13
dep_ratio -0.02 -10.99 -0.02 -10.94 -0.02 -8.25 -0.02 -8.24
rat_emp 0.09 5.91 0.09 5.85 0.16 9.82 0.15 9.72
employed 0.05 5.89 0.05 5.66 -0.02 -4.01 -0.02 -3.97
agehead 0.00 8.03 0.00 8.00      
refhead 0.05 7.31 0.05 7.26        
femhead -0.02 -1.86 -0.02 -1.77        
high_ed 0.10 15.75 0.10 15.68        
WB North -0.11 -14.93 -0.11 -14.85        
WB Centerb                
WB South -0.15 -18.74 -0.15 -18.64        
rural -0.11 -16.37 -0.11 -16.25        
camp -0.07 -5.69 -0.07 -5.63        
constant 7.63 345.45 7.63 345.47        
R2 0.31       0.21      
KP rk under-ident. ChiSq
  1083 p=0.00 1013
CD Wald F >350 >350
HJ over-identific. ChiSq exactly id. exactly id.
IV (excluded) ass, assy,   ass, assy  
F test of fixed effect         1.8 p=0.00    
a This variable has been instrumented; b WB Center, where Ramallah and East Jerusalem are located, is 
assumed as reference.
Note: KP is the Kleibergen-Paap LM test for under-identification of the model; CD is the Cragg Donald 
weak identification test; HJ is the Hansen J statistics for over-identification of the model (cf. Baum et 
al., 2007).
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Gaza Strip – perform on average better than other districts. We do not have econometric 
evidence to explain this. However, we can argue that this happens for different reasons on 
the basis of secondary information. For instance, in the case of the West Bank, residing 
within the municipality of Ramallah or close to it is an advantage in terms of employment 
and market opportunities. Furthermore, the impact of Israeli settlements and territorial frag-
mentation is less pronounced in these areas compared to WB North and WB South. For the 
Gaza Strip, residing close to the decision-making center of the de facto ruling authority and 
further away from the Israeli border22 is an advantage in terms of food security. 
22 Israeli forces enforce a buffer zone by land and sea, the “access restricted areas”. According to Israeli authori-
ties, up to 100 meters from the double wired/concrete fence built along the Gaza-Israel border is a “no go” area 
and up to 200 meters there is no access for heavy machinery. However, “humanitarian partners in the field have 
Table 11. Asset-based poverty index regression models, Gaza Strip.
Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS Fixed Effect Fixed Effect IV
Coef. Student’s t Coef. z Coef. Student’s t Coef. z
massa -0.03 -14.98 -0.03 -14.38 -0.02 -9.32 -0.02 -8.74
ydum 0.03 2.67 0.03 2.17 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.16
massya 0.00 -1.5 0.00 -1.08 0.00 1.34 0.00 1.15
lhsize -0.35 -43.49 -0.35 -43.28 -0.33 -33.63 -0.33 -33.69
dep_ratio -0.02 -9.1 -0.02 -9.11 -0.02 -6.81 -0.02 -6.82
rat_emp 0.14 7.86 0.14 7.86 0.12 7.46 0.12 7.49
employed 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.20 -0.01 -1.45 -0.01 -1.46
agehead 0.00 7.82 0.00 7.80      
refhead 0.02 3.06 0.02 3.06        
femhead -0.02 -2.13 -0.02 -2.11        
high_ed 0.07 11.34 0.07 11.14        
GS North 0.00 0.36 -0.01 -1.05        
GS Centerb                
GS South 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.08        
rural 0.01 0.4 0.01 0.40        
camp -0.01 -0.9 -0.01 -0.88        
constant 7.52 314.63 7.52 312.85        
R2 0.48       0.46      
KP rk under-identific. ChiSq p=0.00
CD Wald F >350 >350
HJ over-identification ChiSq exactly id. exactly id.
IV (excluded) ass, assy   ass, assy  
F test of fixed effect         1.5 p=0.00    
a This variable has been instrumented; b GS Center, where Gaza City is located, is assumed as reference.
Note: KP is the Kleibergen-Paap LM test for under-identification of the model; CD is the Cragg Donald 
weak identification test; HJ is the Hansen J statistics for over-identification of the model (cf. Baum et 
al., 2007).
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The FCS results are quite different. According to OLS estimates (first column of Table 
13), the quality of food consumption in Palestine seems to be negatively affected by the 
intensity of assistance.23 However, in the fixed effects model, the interaction parameter is 
not significant. All variables whose coefficients are statistically significant show the same 
signs as in the poverty index models except for two cases: the dependency ratio and the 
household size. They both have a positive effect on FCS, possibly because a larger num-
ber of household members includes a sizeable share of children and elders calling for par-
ticularly dietary requirements and/or making the household more eligible for food aid 
targeting. Regional dummies are all negative vis-à-vis Central Gaza except for the North 
and Central West Bank. The latter two regions show non-significant coefficients, possibly 
explained by higher population density and more urban nature.  
The West Bank and Gaza Strip models provide quite a different picture when consid-
ering the fixed effect model. The impact of assistance on FCS is positive and significant in 
the West Bank but it is not significant in the Gaza Strip. This may depend on the nature of 
the outcome variable. A higher FCS presupposes the availability and physical accessibility 
of a variety of food, a condition that may not have held in Gaza Strip because of the open 
armed conflict and strict blockade that occurred in 2014. 
Keeping in mind that under these very specific conditions food security was pursued 
primarily through humanitarian assistance, we have to consider that in-kind food aid is 
based on food baskets containing only basic foodstuffs such as wheat flour, rice, pulses 
and vegetable oil. Therefore, in order to assess the impact of assistance on FCS via in-kind 
food aid, we disentangled the overall FCS in three additive components24 and estimated 
the impact model per each FCS component (Table 14).
Doing so resulted in a slightly different picture. The intensity of assistance showed 
a positive impact of the two components provided via in-kind food assistance. The first 
component, which includes cereals, tubers, pulses, fruits and vegetables, is positive though 
significant only at p=90%. The second component, which includes oil and sugar, has a 
positive and significant impact at p=95%. Conversely, the component not included in the 
food aid basket, i.e. the meat and milk component, was not significant. This may be attrib-
uted in part to the nature of in-kind food assistance constituted of cereals, pulses and veg-
etable oil during the war in Gaza and in part to the low-income elasticity of these food 
categories as a source of low-cost calories and proteins. The less significant relationship 
found with reference to the first components can be explained by the dramatic drop in the 
availability of fruit and vegetables in the Gaza Strip as a result of the war.25 This drop was 
only partially compensated by the in-kind food assistance of cereals and pulses. In conclu-
sion, food security was ensured more in terms of the quantity of food provided than the 
reported that in practice up to 300 metres from the perimeter fence is considered by most farmers as a “no-go” 
area and up to 1,000 metres a “high risk” area” (OCHA, 2018: 5). This area is where most military operations 
take place.
23 Higher FCS scores means in fact higher food quality as it measures food security in term of diet diversifica-
tion.
24 The three components and the relevant FCS weights are the following: fruits, vegetables, cereals, tubers and 
pulses (weights from 1 to 3); milk and meats (weight equal to 4); oil, sugar and others (weight equal to 0.5).
25 Commercial food imports to the Gaza Strip cover a significant share of Gazan food needs. They stopped 
almost completely in the second half of 2014 because of the war and were partially offset by humanitarian 
imports providing food aid (Latino and Flämig, 2017).
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quality of diet during the war and following the conclusion of the hostility, at the height of 
the humanitarian crisis when interventions were primarily a matter of saving lives.
7. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the scanty literature on the impact of humanitarian assis-
tance interventions and outcomes (Clarke et al., 2014). It aims to answer a question that, 
to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be addressed: does assistance – broadly defined as 
any type of in-kind or cash transfer – improve the well-being of Palestinian households? 
To do so, we apply advanced econometric techniques and impact evaluation approaches 
widely advocated in the debate on aid effectiveness (cf. section 2.2). Specifically, we cou-
pled the classical counterfactual framework of impact evaluation analysis with fixed effect 
econometric modelling using a difference-in-difference approach. This allowed us to treat 
sample selection bias. We also instrumented the fixed effect model to get rid of endogene-
ity where needed, such as in poverty models.
The main results are in line with existing literature (Ruel et al., 2013). Assistance is 
indeed crucial to support the standards of living of Palestinians: both poverty and food 
insecurity would have been much higher without the massive assistance provided by the 
international community to Palestine. This result supports similar conclusions attained by 
recent studies on contexts marked by violent conflicts and food insecurity crises (Doocy 
and Tappis, 2016; Mercier et al., 2017; Trachant et al., 2018). We confirmed the key role 
played by assistance, specifically food aid, extending the evidence to a protracted crisis 
context such as Palestine.
The first policy implication is therefore that the international community should not 
keep disengaging from supporting Palestinian households. Over the last decade, over-
all assistance to Palestine shrank by two thirds since 2008. The international commu-
nity should be aware that if assistance continues to diminish, the severely negative con-
sequences on the ground will affect the wellbeing of these households. More generally, 
the positive impact of assistance on poverty reduction and food security established in 
Table 14. FCS components fixed effect regression models, Gaza Strip
Total Cereals, pulses, vegetables & fruit Meat & milk Oil & sugar
Coef. Student ‘s t Coef Student’s t Coef Student’s t Coef Student’s t
mass -1.04 -5.44 -0.20 -3.31 -0.83 -5.01 -0.01 -0.97
ydum -3.78 -3.28 0.23 0.62 -3.37 -3.46 -0.63 -8.12
massy 0.27 1.01 0.14 1.72 0.09 0.39 0.03 2.01
lhsize 5.11 5.76 1.39 5.18 3.37 4.27 0.35 5.77
dep_ratio 0.10 0.33 -0.06 -0.71 0.23 0.88 -0.07 -3.39
rat_emp 8.03 5.30 -0.15 -0.31 8.14 6.21 0.05 0.51
employed -0.43 -1.02 0.24 1.87 -0.66 -1.75 -0.02 -0.53
R2 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.06
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this paper encourages renewed investment and further effort in enhancing aid effective-
ness through better coordination of implementing actors and better design, targeting and 
delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people. 
It is important to keep in mind that the average positive impact of assistance hides a 
lot of heterogeneity with marked differences on each outcome dimension (poverty, quan-
tity of food consumed, diet diversity) and region (West Bank or Gaza Strip). In the case 
of poverty reduction, there is a clear positive impact of intensity of assistance for both 
Palestine as a whole and the West Bank. However, this relationship is not significant for 
the Gaza Strip, probably because of the July-August 2014 war that could have blurred the 
causal relationship between assistance and poverty reduction. 
Assistance has a positive and significant impact on the amount of food consumed 
(proxied by HFIAS) in both regions, though the impact is much larger in the Gaza Strip 
than in the West Bank. This is thanks to massive in-kind food aid, food vouchers and cash 
interventions during and after the 2014 war that helped keep levels of food consumption 
at an acceptable level and restore household resilience (Brück et al., 2018). In the case of 
diet diversity (proxied by the FCS), there is no significant impact of assistance for Pales-
tine as a whole. The impact is however significantly positive for the West Bank but not for 
the Gaza Strip. When disentangling this last result according to main diet components, we 
see that the two components included in the food basket provided to households in need 
– cereals and pulses, and oil and sugar – have positively affected  Gazan households. This 
is true despite the fact that in-kind food aid was only partially able to compensate for the 
dramatic drop in the availability of fruit and vegetables imports during and after the 2014 
military escalation. 
A second policy implication therefore relates to the importance of the composi-
tion of food baskets provided to a population in need in order to ensure a balanced diet 
(Webb et al., 2014). This issue was raised in recent worldwide debates, specifically in Pal-
estine where the food basket provided by UNRWA (OCHA, 2016) and by WFP (2017a 
and 2017b), the two most important implementing agencies, recently changed in order to 
provide more fortified and balanced food baskets. Careful consideration of the composi-
tion of food baskets is extremely important, especially when considering long-term con-
sequences of a balanced diet to targeted households with children (Alderman et al., 2006).
Our study presents some limits. Understanding why assistance determined the above-
mentioned outcomes would require more detailed information as well as an informa-
tion-eliciting tool different from the one used by the SEFSec. Indeed, the SEFSec dataset, 
although quite informative on quantitative aspects of assistance to Palestinian households, 
is not able to open the black box of mechanisms that lead to these outcomes. Nor was 
it possible to analyze the effectiveness of different forms and sources of assistance, which 
affect the logics of intervention in a different manner. Addressing these topics would have 
required a larger and more detailed database supplemented by qualitative information, 
which we did not have.
Nevertheless, the SEFSec dataset may be further exploited to shed light on issues such 
as the spatial distribution of assistance. The dataset could even be used to conduct a finer 
analysis of the impact of different types of assistance on food security as soon as the third 
wave (carried out in late 2018) data is made available. Methodological speaking, a possible 
future improvement to consider would be to model the different impact of assistance on 
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asset accumulation/decumulation or even on household expenditure, provided the data is 
of adequate quality.
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